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Abstract: 
This is an ethnographic study of the reception of popular culture (music, films, and television) 
among bourgeois, Parisian children between the ages of 7 and 12. Pierre Bourdieu’s idea of 
social distinction has been used as a model to describe the tastes of the French bourgeoisie since 
the 1970s, though some sociologists, such as Joël Zaffran and Marie-Laure Pouchadon, have 
argued that its usefulness in recent decades has waned. In this article, I argue that the notion of 
social distinction is just as useful now as it was in the 1970s, but that based on the tastes of these 
young, bourgeois informants, the criteria for what constitutes cultural capital, an essential 
ingredient for social distinction, have changed. This study supports the notion that the distinction 
between high and low culture, which used to be central to achieving social distinction, has been 
supplanted by a new criterion for social distinction that relies on “cultural omnivorousness.” 
These children’s parents already exhibited some signs of valuing culturally omnivorous tastes 
and were the first generation to do so. The fact that an appreciation for cultural omnivorousness 
has been transmitted from bourgeois parents to these pre-adolescent children is a sign that this 
means of achieving social distinction has gone from a probationary, exploratory phase to a more 
stable and lasting one. 
Ceci est une étude ethnographique de la réception de la culture populaire (musique, cinéma, et 
télévision) chez des enfants bourgeois parisiens âgés de 7 à 12 ans. Depuis les années 1970, le 
concept de Pierre Bourdieu de la distinction sociale sert à décrire les goûts de la bourgeoisie 
française, bien que certains sociologues, tels que Joël Zaffran et Marie-Laure Pouchadon 
prétendent que son utilité a diminué au cours des dernières décennies. Dans cet article, je 
soutiens l’idée que la notion de la distinction sociale est aussi utile maintenant qu’elle n’a été 
dans les années 1970, mais les goûts de ces jeunes informateurs bourgeois indiquent que les 
critères qui déterminent ce qui constitue le capital culturel, un ingrédient essential de la 
distinction sociale, ont changé. Cette étude soutient la notion que la distinction entre la culture 
avec un grand C et la culture populaire, qui autrefois était centrale à l’acquisition de la 
distinction sociale, a été supplantée par un nouveau critère pour la distinction sociale qui dépend 
d’une "consomption culturelle omnivore." Les parents de ces enfants ont déjà présenté des signes 
de valoriser des goûts culturellement omnivores et ont été la première génération à le faire. Le 
fait que l’appréciation d’une consomption culturelle omnivore a été transmise des parents 
bourgeois à ces enfants pré-adolescents est un signe que ce moyen d’acquérir de la distinction 
sociale est passé d’une phase exploratoire potentiellement temporaire à une phase plus stable et 
durable.  
The Cultural Tastes of Bourgeois Pre-adolescents in France:  Cultural Ominvorousness as 
a New Form of Cultural Capital 
Pierre Bourdieu’s idea of social distinction has been used as a model to describe the tastes of the 
French bourgeoisie since the 1970s, though some sociologists, such as Joël Zaffran and Marie-
Laure Pouchadon, have argued that its usefulness in recent decades has waned (Pouchadon and 
Zaffran). In this article, I argue that the notion of social distinction is just as useful now as it was 
in the 1970s, but that the criteria for what constitutes cultural capital, an essential ingredient for 
social distinction, have changed.  
This is an ethnographic study of the reception of popular culture (music, films, books, television, 
and video games) among bourgeois, French children between the ages of 7 and 12, whose 
parents all have high levels of cultural capital (measured by levels of education).1 Almost all of 
them have high levels of economic capital as well. They are what might be called “bourgeois-
bohemians” or “Bobos,” a category that entered the French vernacular in the early 2000s.2 While 
Bobos are defined as both bourgeois and bohemian, the bourgeois component of the definition 
matters more, to the extent that Bobos should be understood simply as new form of bourgeois 
(Gunther). Bobo tastes, however, are not the same as their bourgeois predecessors. For one thing, 
they do not live in the traditionally bourgeois neighborhoods of western Paris, but have opted 
instead for the more multi-ethnic, working-class – although quickly gentrifying –  neighborhoods 
to the east. In addition, their political views are solidly on the left, especially with respect to 
ecological and social issues, such as same-sex marriage. Also, rather than pursuing traditionally 
bourgeois careers in fields like medicine, law, or business, Bobos tend to have jobs in creative, 
artistic, educational, or high-tech sectors. What they share with the traditional bourgeoisie is a 
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preoccupation with acquiring various forms of capital, including economic, social, and cultural 
capital, and passing them on to future generations.  
For Pierre Bourdieu, to be bourgeois requires participation in “a multidimensional status game in 
which people draw on three different types of resources [what he terms economic, cultural, and 
social capital] to compete for status [what he terms ‘symbolic capital’]. Distinct from economic 
capital (financial resources) and social capital (relationships, organizational affiliations, 
networks), cultural capital consists of a set of socially rare and distinctive tastes, skills, 
knowledge, and practices” (Holt 3). For Bobos, cultural capital matters more than economic 
capital. Sociologist Sophie Corbillé explained in her study of Bobos that they make up “a social 
group that occupies a relatively high position in the social hierarchy, endowed with some 
economic capital, although this can vary, along with strong social and cultural capital linked to 
family origin, educational pursuits and professional activities” (Corbillé 96, emphasis added). 
Similarly, in Laure Watrin and Thomas Legrand’s study, La République bobo, they define Bobos 
as “people whose cultural capital (high) carries more weight than their economic capital (varied) 
in determining where to live and which values they consider positive or negative” (Watrin and 
Legrand 33, emphasis added). 
It is clear that the informants for this article should not be seen as typical, French – or even as 
typical, Parisian – children (indeed, several parents felt the need to point this out to me). Almost 
all these children have traveled extensively outside France, have easy access to foreign media 
sources through services like Netflix and cable television, live in families with a variety of 
electronic media devices including e-readers, tablet computers, smartphones, and screens 
connected to cable channels and digital video recorders. They all demonstrated high levels of 
technological sophistication, including familiarity with a wide range of electronic devices and 
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knowledge of how to find less main-stream media sources on the internet, along with high levels 
of cultural sophistication, including for example, knowledge of what sorts of music or films are 
associated with “high culture.” 
Some work has already been done on the reception of globalized popular culture by teens or pre-
teens in other countries, but this work has focused primarily on non-Western countries, including 
Ecuador, Vietnam and Nigeria.3 These studies have relied on notions of cultural imperialism, 
which emphasizes the power of Western culture and efforts to resist it in non-Western cultures, 
or alternatively on hybridity, which represents the process not as a one-way influence of the 
dominant Western center on the non-Western periphery, but as one where local and foreign 
cultures are blended resulting in a cultural identity that preserves local specificities. France 
represents an entirely different cultural environment. It has a strong sense of national identity and 
has itself been in the position of exporting its culture to other places, arguably more than any 
other Western country besides the United States. In addition, defenders of French culture 
consider it to be on par with, if not superior to, American culture, so the power dynamics of the 
French situation are entirely different from those in non-Western countries. Unlike the pre-
adolescents from the Ecuadorian, Vietnamese and Nigerian studies, who were keenly aware of 
their country’s hierarchical position relative to other, primarily Western, countries, the young, 
French, bourgeois informants of this study were not concerned about France’s position among 
world cultures. They were, however, mindful of their own social position within France. 
Beginning with the generation of these children’s parents, the distinction between high and low 
culture, which used to be central to achieving social distinction for earlier bourgeois generations 
in France, was supplanted by a new criterion for social distinction that relies on “cultural 
omnivorousness.” Unlike their parents, however, who broke with the criteria used for social 
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distinction by earlier generations, these children have imitated the culturally omnivorous tastes 
of their parents, thereby confirming that cultural omnivorousness has now become a means of 
reproducing class distinction. 
Methodology 
I conducted interviews with 25 pre-adolescent children between the ages of 7 and 12 in the 
summer of 2017.4 The children knew that I was American, which may have influenced their 
responses. They may, for example, have spent more time explaining French cultural phenomena 
to me than they would have to a native-French interviewer or felt less comfortable asserting 
negative opinions of US popular culture. 
I met with the informants in small groups (two to five children at a time) for approximately 45 
minutes. Most of these interviews took place in the homes of one of the children interviewed. 
Two of the meetings were held at the Médiatheque Françoise Sagan in Paris and one was held in 
a café. I made audio recordings of these conversations and transcribed them. The interviews were 
conducted in French and translations of the informants’ statements are my own. I began by 
asking them open-ended questions about their media practices: What kinds of media do they 
consume? What do they like and dislike? Why? I asked parents not to be present or to participate 
in these discussions. Afterward, I would spend a few minutes talking with the parents to get 
information about their educational levels and professional paths, which gave me a general sense 
of their levels of cultural and economic capital. 
I found informants by contacting people who participated in a study I conducted in 2013 and 
2014 on Parisian “Bobos” who have children of that age group and agreed to let me meet with 
them (Gunther). I asked these parents to put me in contact with other parents, a method 
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commonly referred to as “snowball sampling,” which has both disadvantages (the sample may 
not be representative since it lacks randomness) and advantages (it allows researchers to locate 
members of populations where there might not be any lists or other sources for finding them). 
Consequently, almost all the informants (21 out of 25) live in the same neighborhood, the 10th 
arrondissement of Paris, or what can be considered the heart of “Boboland.”  The four children 
who do not live in the 10th arrondissement nevertheless have parents with ties to parents in this 
neighborhood, since they were referred to me by friends of theirs living there. Though the 
parents of these four children lack the geographic criterion for what constitutes a Bobo, they 
satisfy the other criteria, including having careers in creative or high-tech sectors, left-leaning 
political values, high levels of education, and an openness to foreign cultures.  
Cultural omnivorousness as a new form of cultural capital 
Joël Zaffran and Marie-Laure Pouchadon contend that Bourdieu’s notion of social distinction 
was a useful means of analyzing adolescent tastes back in the 1960s and 70s, but argue that 
today, with the erosion of the distinction between high and low culture, the paradigm of social 
distinction is of less explanative value (Pouchadon and Zaffran 171-172).5 My study, however, 
stems from the work of other sociologists, inspired by the ideas of Richard Peterson, who have 
argued otherwise, claiming instead that the distinction between high and low culture has been 
merely replaced with a new criterion for social distinction that relies on “cultural 
omnivorousness” and have found a correlation between omnivorous cultural tastes and high 
social status, mostly in the form of advanced education.6 
For Peterson, omnivorous taste “does not signify that the omnivore likes everything 
indiscriminately. Rather, it signifies an openness to appreciating everything. In this sense, it is 
antithetical to snobbishness, which is based fundamentally on rigid rules of exclusion…such as: 
 6 
‘It is de rigueur to like opera, and country music is an anathema to be shunned’” (Peterson and 
Kern 904). In this way, it is not genres themselves that are not hierarchized, but rather the 
cultural products that exist within each genre. In addition, the ethnocentrism that frequently 
accompanies univorous cultural taste is replaced with cultural relativism, so that each cultural 
product is not evaluated simply according to whether it is part of the canon of high culture, but in 
its own context.  
Cultural capital, like any form of capital for that matter, cannot be easy to acquire, or else it 
would lose its value, and so, if being a discerning cultural omnivore contributes to cultural 
capital, it cannot be too easy to become one. It requires deep knowledge of hierarchies within all 
genres as opposed to the traditional bourgeois model, which consisted of acquiring knowledge 
primarily about cultural products that belonged to high-brow genres. It is consequently not 
surprising that the distinction between univorous and omnivorous tastes is correlated with social 
class, such that “the probability of being a univore declines steadily as level of status and also of 
education increase. On the other hand, the probability of…being a true omnivore [is] positively 
related to status and education” (Chan and Goldthorpe 13).  
The univore/omnivore distinction, which originated in the Anglo-American context, has also 
been observed in the French context. In their study of French musical tastes across social groups, 
Hervé Glévareca and Michel Pinet concluded that “the high status groups have become more 
heterogeneous…in their musical choices and perhaps also more broadly in their cultural 
choices…We would argue that this model can also apply to literature, television and comic 
books because the heterogeneity of legitimacy orders also applies to books (i.e. detective novels 
for example are legitimised), television (“quality” television series) and comic books (comics of 
Japanese origin, manga), etc. One key point of [this study is that] the internal hierarchy and 
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cultural judgments are located ‘in’ genre and no longer ‘between’ genres as argued by Bourdieu 
in the Distinction model” (Glévarec and Pinet 81). Olivier Donnat’s study of French tastes came 
to similar conclusions, using the term “cultural eclecticism” instead of omnivore: “The world of 
the hip (branché) people, which lies at the intersection of the worlds of the classical and the 
modern, is made up of a dominant minority of skilled consumers of cultural offerings... The main 
organizer of their tastes is eclecticism, which is the ability to make associations across…literary, 
musical, and performance genres, which seem disconnected or even irreconcilable. This ability 
to separate the wheat from the chaff, regardless of the status of the… genres in question requires 
as strong of a familiarity with classical music as with other forms of modern expression, and 
requires the possession of many advantages in terms of cultural capital, including the availability 
and proximity of cultural offerings. To be a part of this world is largely the privilege of middle-
aged, unmarried people with advanced degrees living in large cities, especially Paris” (Donnat 
91). Others studies from Guy Bellavance, Myrtille Valex, Michel Ratté, and Philippe 
Coulangeon have come to similar conclusions in the French context.(Bellavance et al.; 
Coulangeon) 
This article, which looks at the tastes of pre-adolescents, builds on these studies that found 
cultural omnivorousness to be a new form of cultural capital in bourgeois adults. It shows that 
this shift in the definition of what constitutes cultural capital has now been transmitted to a 
younger generation. By looking at the case of pre-adolescents as opposed to adults, this study 
tells us that the social value associated with cultural omnivorousness is not going away anytime 
soon. If anything, given the increase in options for cultural consumption (due primarily to 
technological changes, but also to increased ethnic diversity in France) it is likely to grow even 
stronger. These children’s parents were the first bourgeois generation to value culturally 
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omnivorous tastes. This study shows that the appreciation for cultural omnivorousness has now 
been transmitted from one bourgeois generation to another and has thus become a means of 
reproducing class distinction. 
Findings 
The tastes of these children reflected tensions of three different types: First, their tastes showed 
high levels of cosmopolitan sophistication at times, while at others, exposed ignorance of the 
world beyond France; second, their tastes were often an imitation of those of their parents, 
though sometimes they indicated the children’s efforts to distinguish themselves from their 
parents; and finally, their tastes were shaped by both the desire to increase social distinction and 
the pressure for social conformity, which is relatively strong at their age. All three of these 
tensions are related to their position as somewhere between childhood and adulthood and are 
useful in thinking about why the informants’ tastes both resemble and differ from the tastes that 
adults in their social milieu are expected to have. They also all demonstrate the extent to which 
cultural omnivorousness has become an important form of cultural capital in their social 
environment. 
1. Cosmopolitan sophistication vs. ignorance of foreign places  
One prominent feature of these children’s tastes was the extent to which they consumed cultural 
products from places other than France and the lack of a hierarchy of cultural products based on 
their countries of origin. However, the fact that they consume media from a range of countries 
may not be sufficient to label their tastes cosmopolitan. As Vincenzo Cicchelli and Sylvie 
Octobre explain, it is important “to distinguish clearly between consumption patterns and the 
intentionality behind them: one can consume numerous foreign products without ever 
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considering the alterity, one can also consume few foreign products in a particular cultural sector 
and develop a strong sense of curiosity. Intention is at the core of a cosmopolitan attitude” 
(Cicchelli and Octobre 49). In this study, the children did not consume media from different 
countries indiscriminately, but chose media from around the globe according to the media that 
each place was known for. This is similar to the conclusion reached by a 2016 study from the 
Ministry of Culture and Communication of young people between the ages of 18 and 26, for 
whom “Hollywood produces blockbusters, science fiction movies, and action movies, 
Bollywood is known for its singing romantic comedies, Asian cinema is associated with martial 
arts films and animated films. In the same way, certain television series are ‘American’ because 
of the jumpiness of their editing and the rhythm of their scripts, others are ‘British’ through their 
humor and historical precision; yet others are ‘French’ by their focus on family life and 
emotions. For animated films, the label ‘Franco-Belgian,’ ‘manga,’ and ‘comics’ refer to three 
distinct esthetics linked to specific cultural origins. And finally, music is ‘American’ if it is rock, 
rap, blue, or R&B, ‘British’ if it is pop, and more recently, ‘Korean’ if it is K-pop – and lastly, 
‘French’ if it is soft rock or vocal music (variétes)” (Cicchelli and Octobre 32).  
One informant, Samuel (age 10), said he watches more foreign movies than French movies, 
because his mother has many Chinese and Indian films. Samuel explained that “my mom has 
three or four shelves of Chinese DVDs, about four shelves of Indian movies, and only two 
shelves of French movies.” He went on to say that he likes Chinese movies but not Indian 
movies, because “the Chinese movies are well made, but the Indian films are just a bunch of 
people dancing around.” 
Chloé [age 10] was also open to media from other places and made choices based on a country’s 
reputation for good music: “Every time a new pop song comes out, I give it chance, regardless of 
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the language. What matters is the rhythm and some countries just have better rhythms” [with 
this, several other children spontaneously started singing “Youpala, youpala…,” a song from 
Zaak Tanjawi, who is of Moroccan origin]. 
Others made similar comments including: 
Interviewer: “Does the fact that the [amusement park] Park Astérix is based on a 
French character while Disney is American make a difference?” 
Adam [age 12]: “The difference is that Disney just knows how to make better 
rides.” 
Adam [age 12]: “Yeah, I used to listen to a lot of Eminem, but now I listen to lots 
of different things, techno, rap…Good rap is French or American, but the problem 
with French rap is that I understand the words and can tell it’s vulgar, sometimes 
even very vulgar, which my parents don’t like.” 
Chloé [age 10]: “I watch series in Spanish like Chica Vampiro and Soy Luna, 
because they’re better than the French shows.” 
It is perhaps less surprising to see the ease with which they move between cultural products from 
France and elsewhere when one considers how extensively they have traveled. All of them had 
travelled to multiple countries outside of France, and about half of them had gone outside of 
Europe. Five of them had been to the United States (two of them for extended periods of time), 
four to places in Asia, and three to places in Africa. In their multi-ethnic neighborhood in Paris, 
they go to school with children from other countries and have access to restaurants and shops 
with cuisines from around the world. In discussing their favorite foods, they generally made little 
distinction between French foods and foods from other places. The most common foreign 
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cuisines mentioned were Japanese, Chinese, Vietnamese, North African, and Indian. I was 
particularly struck by Théo’s [age 9] level of sophistication in describing his favorite dish: “I 
love Tiep, it’s an African dish. [My family and I] go to the market and we buy home-made Tiep. 
It’s from Senegal. It’s grouper, mixed with cooked cabbage. It’s so good, I promise. It’s a stew 
with fish, cooked cabbage, cassava, potatoes, carrots, and all that with sauce. Oh, and red rice!” 
Yet, despite their openness to other cultures, many informants demonstrated some ignorance of 
other cultures, as should be expected considering their age. 
Quentin [age 9]: “I love Star Wars, Harry Potter, Jurassic Park.”  
Interviewer: “Are there any French films you like?” 
Quentin [age 9]: “I don’t even know of any French films. They’re all American. 
Oh wait, there’s Mary Poppins, that’s French right?” 
Alma [age 12]: “But over there [in the US] children wear uniforms to school.” 
[Alma was one of several children to make this comment. My guess is that this is 
from images of school children in uniforms in Harry Potter books and films and 
their conflation of the United States and England.] 
Ignorance of differences among foreign places would seem to undermine Vincenzo Cicchelli and 
Sylvie Octobre’s idea that the desire to consume cultural products from a variety of places must 
be intentional in order for such consumption to be labeled “cosmopolitan.”  In this case, 
however, the informants’ displays of ignorance were not common enough to challenge the 
overall intentionality of their cultural choices.  
Cosmopolitan tastes have always contributed to cultural capital. To know what is good beyond 
France requires effort and this assures that such knowledge remains rare, an essential ingredient 
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for cultural capital. However, this has traditionally not been the case for knowledge of US 
popular culture, which is omnipresent and easy to access, and hence has traditionally contributed 
little to one’s cultural capital. Richard Kuisel has pointed out that in the decades following World 
War II, there was a strong correlation between social class and attitudes toward American 
popular media, such that “elites more than the average French men or women…harbored cultural 
anti-Americanism” (Kuisel, Seducing the French: The Dilemma of Americanization 34-35).  
Consequently, one would expect my young bourgeois informants to be somewhat dismissive of 
American cultural products, but it turns out that there was no evidence of this being the case. 
Indeed, before conducting this study, my initial expectation was that it would enable me to 
analyze the sorts of distinctions French children make between French media and foreign, 
especially US, media. During my conversations with the children, I did not ask them explicitly to 
compare French and US media, but analyzed the transcripts later to look for subtle indications of 
a distinction between US and French media. In the end, this distinction was of little or no 
concern to them. Instead, as will be discussed below, other distinctions were more salient. 
My informants’ lack of distinction between American and French cultural products does fit with 
Kuisel’s most recent study, however, where he notes that by the end of the 20th century, the split 
between the French elite and the general public in attitudes toward American cultural products 
had disappeared: 
With respect to American popular culture, conventional wisdom has held that 
elites have been less receptive than the public…[but] surveys do not corroborate 
this thesis for the fin de siècle. Or, at least, the two social groups seemed to agree 
if the question asked was simply, “In general what is your opinion of American 
popular culture such as music, television, and films?” Faced with a 
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favorable/unfavorable binary, favorable answers were given by the public and 
elites at almost the same levels (52 percent and 49 percent, respectively) in 2000 
(Kuisel, The French Way 346). 
How then does one explain this change in attitudes toward US cultural products among French 
elites? The statements from these pre-teens offer some clues. The informants for this study 
consumed large amounts of foreign media, and it is true that they did not create hierarchies of 
cultural products based merely on the products’ countries of origin. This does not mean, 
however, that they consumed indiscriminately. Instead in most cases, what mattered to them was 
not whether the cultural product came from a place that was perceived to be culturally 
sophisticated across the board, but whether it came from a place with a reputation for quality 
with respect to that specific cultural genre. This is a one important feature of cultural 
omnivorousness. 
It is important to note that consumption of foreign media on its own is not inevitably perceived 
as cosmopolitan, nor does it necessarily contribute to cultural capital. I mentioned in the 
introduction to this article that these children should not be considered typical Parisian children, 
because of their technological sophistication and their access to foreign cultures. But there is 
another way in which they are not representative of the children that inhabit their neighborhood: 
though almost all of them live in the highly ethnically diverse 10th arrondissement, all of their 
parents, with the exception of just two, were white, “Français de souche” (the two others were 
each in a bi-national couple with a French person). I deliberately chose classically “Franco-
French” pseudonyms for them for this reason. Many non-Bobo children in their neighborhood 
have foreign parents, speak a language other than French at home, are deeply familiar with their 
parents’ cultures, periodically visit their parents’ countries of origin, and consume media from 
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these countries, while at the same time, speaking French, learning about French culture and 
history, and consuming French media. Yet this kind of bi- (or often multi-) culturalism is not 
valued in the same way as the Bobo children’s openness to foreign cultures.  
This distinction is echoed in other studies of the value given to elite cosmopolitanism and the 
lack of value given to the multiculturalism of immigrant populations in Western countries. In her 
study of immigrants living in Berlin, Jude Bloomfield distinguishes between “weltoffen” 
(“cosmopolitan” or literally, “open to the world”) and “multicultural.” The former describes the 
image that Berlin’s elite would like to project of their city as “an internationally open, high 
cultural metropolis,” while the latter, which is associated with the day-to-day experience of the 
city’s hundreds of thousands of foreign residents, is largely unacknowledged (Bloomfield 1). 
Ruth Mandel’s study of the social position of Turks in Germany finds that “the stereotype that 
would isolate a mustached Turkish migrant slicing meat off his rotisserie in a kebab shop fails to 
recognize that an entire transnational world unfolds within these very boundaries.” Not only does 
this person need to learn to speak German and to navigate German bureaucracy, but also to 
understand German cultural tastes well enough to develop a product that Germans actually want, 
as opposed to one that is based on an authentic Turkish recipe. She argues for “a more nuanced 
understanding of the immigrant population [that] might view Turkish Germans less as ghettoized 
victims than creative players whose skills may be transferred across boundaries—geographic, 
political, or cultural” (Mandel 312). In his study of the meaning of “cosmopolitanism” in the 
West, Craig Calhoun explains that the distinction between elite cosmopolitanism and common 
cultural diversity exists, because it serves as a means of preserving social inequality:  
Cosmopolitanism—though not necessarily cosmopolitan democracy— is now 
largely the project of capitalism, and it flourishes in the top management of 
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multinational corporations and even more in the consulting firms that serve them. 
Such cosmopolitanism often joins elites across national borders while ordinary 
people live in local communities. This is not simply because common folk are less 
sympathetic to diversity—a self- serving notion of elites…[A]dvocates of 
cosmopolitan democracy often offer a vision of political reform attractive to elites 
partly because it promises to find virtue without radical redistribution of wealth or 
power (Calhoun 890-893).  
In a similar way to the studies mentioned above, the case of Bobo children in Paris is an 
illustration of how social distinction along ethnic lines is preserved by distinguishing between 
elite cosmopolitanism and the day-to-day multiculturalism of foreign children. The French 
context, however, is not the same as that of Germany. While the multiculturalism of immigrants 
in Germany might be merely unappreciated, in France it is decried. Under the French Republican 
model, assimilation is highly valued and multiculturalism is not. Immigrants to France must 
leave cultural differences at the border, lest they be accused of communautarisme. As a result, a 
child of North-African descent who consumes both French and North-African media is likely to 
serve as an example of a failure to assimilate, whereas an ethnically French child who does the 
same can be seen as open to the world.  
2. Imitating vs. distinguishing themselves from their parents 
While the cultural practices of parents may not entirely determine the content of children’s 
cultural consumption, they are relatively strong predictors of the amount of media children will 
consume, such that the children of parents who consume relatively little cultural content from a 
particular medium are likely themselves to consume little content from that medium (1.5 more 
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likely in the case of music and video games, 2.5 times more likely for reading, and 3 times more 
likely for television and internet use) (Octobre 211).  
Children as inheritors of cultural taste can adopt one of three positions:  they can reproduce the 
tastes of their parents with some adjustments to allow for individual appropriation (for example, 
developing an appreciation for the same genres of film without necessarily liking the same 
specific films); they can redirect the inherited tastes by maintaining the same intensity of 
consumption but for other cultural content (for example, by reading manga instead of graphic 
novels); or they can refuse the transmission of tastes (Octobre 212). Children’s tastes often 
reflect a combination of these three positions, reproducing some tastes and redirecting or 
refusing others. 
In this study, the informants’ tastes showed signs of being inspired by those of their parents. 
While none of the informants said explicitly that they were copying their parents’ tastes, their 
statements often acknowledged that they happened to share tastes with their parents or that they 
were on their way to having tastes similar to those of their parents. 
Noah [age 7]: “I love films from the old days, because they’re different. There are 
actors like you don’t see any more, like Louis de Funès, Pierre Richard. Charlie 
Chapin movies too, I like those. Even if there aren’t words, they’re funny… I love 
movies that are in black and white, and there are no words, they express 
themselves without using words, just by moving. They’re very theatrical in these 
films…I learned about these movies from my parents. They like them too.” 
 17 
Clément [age 9]: “When I grow up, I’ll watch movies with more complicated 
words. I think I’ll watch movies in English where there won’t even be subtitles 
like my parents do.” 
One feature of Bobo tastes is the rejection of ostentatious displays of wealth. In my study of 
Bobos, I found that “the expression of Bobo taste is discreet in all forms of consumption, but this 
is particularly true with fashion, where codes are often decipherable only to other Bobos” 
(Gunther 117). This was reflected in the statements from the few informants who talked about 
clothing. Violette [age 11] said, for example, that “I like fashion, but I don’t want to have a brand 
displayed on my clothes. Well, except for sneakers, there I want to have a brand showing 
something like Nike or Adidas.” 
Another feature of Bobo taste is an appreciation for the ethnic diversity of contemporary France. 
Bobo parents are different from other bourgeois parents, because they have chosen to leave 
traditionally bourgeois neighborhoods in western Paris for less expensive neighborhoods in the 
northeastern part of the city. This migration of young bourgeois adults has been accompanied by 
an increase in the social value associated with living in an economically and ethnically diverse 
neighborhood. In her study of the gentrification of northeastern Paris, Anne Clerval explains: 
Because it is cosmopolitan and socially varied, the [gentrified] neighborhood does 
not represent a village, but a miniature world city, allowing the gentrifiers to link 
symbolically the nearby social diversity with their openness to the world. By 
doing this, the local space of the neighborhood becomes symbolic and material 
capital for the gentrifiers. It is part of a strategy of social distinction…. Valuing 
social diversity allows them above all to make a virtue out of necessity, 
transforming real estate limitations into deliberate choices. It is also an 
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opportunity for conspicuous expression of high moral values, such as openness of 
mind and tolerance (Clerval 168-170). 
The appreciation of ethnic diversity was especially apparent in the significant number of 
informants (12 out of 25) whose favorite music genre is banlieue music, either in the form of hip 
hop or rap. Though these musical styles originated in the United States, “French banlieue music 
very early showed characteristics quite different than those of American hip-hop, most notably, 
the French form quickly became used as a musical way of affirming the multiethnic composition 
of France's population and of articulating a vision of identity that both recognizes and valorizes 
diversity" (Oscherwitz 45). 
Yet, despite the similarities between the parents’ and children’s tastes, there were a couple of 
differences. One difference has to do with the fact that these children’s parents, who moved from 
the traditional bourgeois neighborhoods in western Paris to the working-class neighborhoods in 
the northeast, saw themselves as pioneers, while for most of the children in this study, Boboland 
is where they were born and all they have known. These children’s parents were able to reduce 
the bourgeois guilt associated with the high economic inequality of these rapidly gentrifying 
neighborhoods by thinking of themselves as cultural explorers living among “the people,” in 
ethnically diverse neighborhoods, and as left-leaning progressives willing to break with the 
political values of the traditional bourgeoisie. The children, however, cannot benefit from same 
kind of smug satisfaction that comes from being cultural pioneers like their parents, because their 
appreciation of ethnic diversity and their espousal of progressive political values did not develop 
in opposition to their parents’ values but were passed on from them.  
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The second difference is the relatively small importance that these children grant to whether a 
cultural product came from France or somewhere else, and in particular the United States, 
compared to their parents. 
Jane [age 10]: “My parents don’t like American series because of the laugh 
tracks.” 
Alma [age 12]: “Yeah, my parents say they’re worthless. They always tell me, 
‘Stop watching that American crap!’” 
Jane [age 10]: “Yeah, they think they look fake, since they don’t have ‘real’ 
actors.” 
Clément [age 9]: “Disney characters are just stupid. They’re all like ‘Hi, I’m 
Mickey’ [said with a silly, childish voice].”  
Alma [age 12]: “Yeah, well even if they have stupid characters, the rides in 
Disneyland are good.” 
Jane [age 10]: “Yeah, my parents don’t like Disney.” 
Interviewer: “Do you know why?” 
Jane [age 10]: “No, I don’t know. They just say it’s worthless (in French, “nul”).”  
Clément [age 9]: “Yeah, my parents don’t like Disney either. They say, ‘Oh no, 
let’s not go to Disneyland. It’s so stupid (in French, “nul”). I’m not sure why they 
don’t like it.” 
One way of interpreting these quotations is that the informants’ generation is less culturally anti-
American than their parents’ generation. However, this interpretation would oversimplify their 
parents’ attitudes toward US culture. I discovered in my brief conversations with the informants’ 
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parents, that they do not dismiss US cultural products across the board. The shift from a 
hierarchization of foreign cultures to hierarchizations within the cultural offerings of each 
country described in the previous section was also evidenced in the tastes of the informants’ 
parents. Similarly, the parents did not create hierarchies of genres, where for example, all 
classical music would be superior to all popular music, but instead, recognized that there were 
both good and bad cultural offerings within each genre. Virtually all the parents who talked to 
me about US television expressed contempt for traditional American sitcoms shown dubbed on 
French airwaves, while showing an appreciation for American series available on Netflix or 
cable TV, such as House of Cards, Breaking Bad, or Game of Thrones, and the children seem to 
be learning the distinction between good television options and bad ones from their parents. For 
example, Alma [age 12] explained that “my parents don’t want me to watch just anything. I 
mean, they say that I can only watch series where each episode builds on the last one.” Almost 
all the informants’ parents entered adolescence in the 1980s, a decade that might be seen as a 
turning point in this regard. One sign of a cultural shift was the French Ministry of Culture’s 
decision in the early 1980s to begin “developing a sympathetic public discourse on youth culture 
generally and music particularly” (Looseley 261). The Ministry’s intent was not to value all 
youth culture, but to recognize that within the traditionally low-brow category of “youth 
culture,” one could find cultural products of value. These parents were the first bourgeois 
generation to recognize the potential value of cultural products across genres and to see cultural 
omnivorousness as a means for acquiring cultural capital. 
Another interpretation is that the informants are mid-way in the process of acquiring the tastes 
they should have as adults in their social milieu. Media scholars have a term for the distance 
between the desirable (that which one should want in one’s social milieu) and the desired (that 
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which one actually wants): they call it the “value paradox” (Mooij 78). These informants all had 
parents with high levels of education (high cultural capital), and in that environment, children are 
expected to learn which types of cultural consumption carry the highest levels of cultural capital 
and represent the desirable, though the unfiltered desired from childhood continues to have an 
influence on them. They are beginning to learn that it is not a question of whether a particular 
genre, such as American television, should or should not represent the desirable, but rather, that 
within the genre, there are both desirable and undesirable options. 
3. Social distinction vs. social conformity 
The most significant features of these children’s tastes was the lack of evidence of a hierarchy of 
genres. The near disappearance of hierarchal understanding of genres does not, however, 
necessarily lead to a reduction in the desire for social distinction. Instead, social distinction 
relies, at least in part, on a recent form of cultural capital, which is obtained through openness to 
both foreign cultural products and to cultural products from across a wide array of genres. In her 
study of cultural consumption patterns of adults in Quebec, the sociologist Michèle Ollivier 
observed something similar: 
“[Humanist openness] is the ability to finely discriminate and choose among a 
wide range of cultural options, from the most commonly available products of 
popular culture to much more exclusive forms of high and folk cultures of the 
world. The celebration of extensive and voluntary mobility between cultural 
forms, which is at the core of humanist openness, is most readily available to 
people who possess not only large quantities, but also the right kind of symbolic 
and material resources. Humanist openness is often presented as a quality 
naturally attached to deserving individuals, glossing over the fact that the 
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resources necessary for its appropriation are not equally distributed. Openness to 
diversity thus becomes a new form of cultural capital, in the Bourdieusian sense 
of cultural resources that are widely considered desirable but not equally available 
to all” (Ollivier 142). 
For media forms such as music, films, and books, my informants consumed a wide range of 
genres, including many genres that have traditionally not been associated with high culture (pop 
music, blockbuster films, comic books). It would be incorrect, however, to interpret this as a lack 
of appreciation for the value of accumulating cultural capital. Rather than imagining one genre as 
superior to another, these informants created hierarchies of offerings within each genre. In other 
words, they did not like all comic books, for example, but recognized a hierarchy within the 
medium and gravitated toward those comic books associated with higher levels of social 
prestige.  
For example, Samuel (age 10) demonstrated a clear desire to distinguish himself from his peers 
when he said that “most kids only know the big manga classics, but I have dug much deeper to 
find the less known manga.” He said that he does not share tastes with ordinary French kids at 
school, because he knows “a lot more about manga than they do” and consequently, has not 
“found many kids to share manga with.” Samuel also prefers watching manga with subtitles, 
because “the Japanese voices are much better.” He has found special websites where he can 
watch manga in Japanese and he made a point of telling the interviewer that these sites are not 
easy to find. He also said that he understands some Japanese words now, which he has learned 
just from watching manga. 
The social prestige associated with a particular cultural product could come from an evaluation 
of its quality, but it can also come from its rarity. The informants’ statements indicated that there 
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was value in having access to a product that was out of the ordinary. One informant, Maxime 
[age 10], said that he could not wait for new Legend of Zelda [video game] to come out, and that 
he would be able to get it earlier than other French children, because he is going to get the 
Japanese version. He said he did not mind if the game is in Japanese, what mattered was that he 
would be able to get it before everyone else. In some cases, the cultural product was not actually 
rare, but the informant perceived it to be rare. For example, Théo [age 9] explained that 
“sometimes I like to listen to Sheila, a French singer. She’s not very well known.” The truth is 
that she used to be very well known in the 1960s, 70s and 80s, though what matters is that he 
believes she is unknown, at least among his peers. 
When an informant from the same interview group liked the same thing as someone else, this 
was frequently met with an expression of displeasure by the person who first mentioned it. It was 
a recognition of the value of developing unique, personal tastes. It was surprising that this 
reaction could even occur with widely consumed cultural products: 
Jennie [age 9]: “The thing I really like is Harry Potter.”  
Chloé [age 10]: “Yes, I like Harry Potter too.” 
Jennie [age 9]: “Copycat!” 
The hierarchization of genres was not entirely absent, however. There was evidence, for 
example, that reading books carried more cultural capital than watching television. Five out of 
the twenty-five informants made a point of saying that they did not have a television in their 
house, but watched series from services like Netflix on screens connected to computers instead. 
There was absolutely no shame associated with not owning a television, in fact, it seemed that 
they were saying this with pride, because they recognized that in their social environment not 
having a television had nothing to do with being able to afford one, but represented a recognition 
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that ordinary television programming was something available to almost anyone, and hence, 
provided little opportunity for social distinction. On the other hand, when they spoke about 
reading, they recognized that this was a socially valued activity and something that could 
distinguish them from other children: 
Gabriel [age 9]: “As for me, I read graphic novels, but my friends, they don’t like 
to read.” 
Adam [age 12]: “For me, it’s mostly manga or novels. I read more than my 
friends at school, because I have an e-reader, it’s a Kindle. And I buy lots of 
novels and I read them.” 
Many of the informants also seemed to understand that subtitles could contribute to their social 
distinction more than dubbing could, and though most of them recognized the additional effort 
subtitles require, they overwhelmingly preferred them. Maxime [age 10] said that the “words are 
much better” when there are subtitles for Japanese manga, and that the “words are just more 
interesting when you read subtitles than when they do the show dubbed in French.” Obviously, 
this justification does not make much sense, since both the subtitles and the dubbed words would 
be translated from Japanese to French. It seems like his preference could explained in terms of 
the perception that there is greater prestige associated with subtitled films than with dubbed 
films. Many of the other informants also recognized the value in watching films with subtitles as 
opposed to dubbed films: 
Adam [age 12]: “These days we are being pushed to watch subtitled movies.”  
Interviewer: “What do you think of that?”  
Adam [age 12]: “Now, I prefer it because we hear the real voices. The older you 
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get, the more you notice that lips aren’t matching voices. And then for example, 
there’s a horrible thing, like when I saw Mission Impossible number 5. I saw it in 
English and then afterward, I saw number 2 in French and it was just horrible, 
because the voices changed and it didn’t seem real.”  
Violette [age 11]: “I really like Freaky Friday…When I watch movies in English, 
I watch with subtitles. It doesn’t bother me, even though it’s true that it’s simpler 
to watch when it’s dubbed.” 
Zoe [age 10]: “When you read the subtitles, you don’t see the images. But I prefer 
subtitles [as opposed to dubbing] if I already know the movie.”  
Adèle [age 8]: “I really like Japanese manga in movie form. When I watch them 
on the internet, it’s in Japanese, even though it’s a little bit of a nuisance because 
the subtitles are only in English.” 
Interviewer: “Are subtitles a bit of nuisance in general?”  
Adèle [age 8]: “No, no. My dad loves to watch movies in English, but he always 
watches them with subtitles. I find it more pleasant to listen to them in English, 
because it’s different from French. I prefer subtitles.” 
Romane [age 9]: “Sometimes I watch movies with subtitles at the bottom of the 
screen. But sometimes they go too fast. If I’ve already seen the movie once in 
French, it doesn’t bother me.” 
Yannis [age 11]: “I listen to rap, some American rap and a little more in French.” 
Interviewer: “Does it bother you not to understand the lyrics?”  
Yannis [age 11]: “No, not at all. I watched Star Wars in English.” 
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Interviewer: “And the subtitles didn’t bother you?” 
Yannis [age 11]: “No, not very much, no. My mom watches American TV series 
with subtitles and I really like to watch them with her.” 
Though there were clear signs of seeking out cultural products that other children their ages did 
not know, the informants also demonstrated some social conformity. This is to be expected at 
their age, since “between uniqueness and conformity, [preadolescents] are in a problematic 
position, where they must distinguish themselves while still belonging to the group….” (Azam et 
al. 103). 
The degree of social conformity varied across media forms. While adolescents’ tastes in 
television in particular tend to be heavily influenced by peer pressure, for example, when it 
comes to music, they “have no problem claiming that their practices are eccentric relative to 
those of their peers” (Pouchadon and Zaffran 177). Interactions with peers also determine the 
amount of media consumed, and adolescents with low levels of social interaction are twice as 
likely to be heavy consumers of both recorded music and video games (Octobre 215-216). 
Another form of social conformity was reflected in a clear distinction between the tastes of boys 
and of girls. This is hardly surprising, and indeed, several sociological studies conducted in the 
French context have observed this split, and have shown for example, that “girls on average read 
more books and magazines than boys, while boys spend more time reading comic books and 
playing video games” (Peter 132). One of the strongest splits observed with this group of 
informants was with regard to musical tastes. In fact, every male informant except for two 
mentioned rap as a favorite genre of music, while none of the female informants chose rap as a 
favorite style and some of them mentioned explicitly that they do not like it. Camille [age 9] said 
clearly, “the thing I don’t like is rap. Everything that boys listen to is just bad.”  
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Among the informants were three pairs of siblings and there were signs of conformity in these 
situations as well, with the younger sibling frequently saying that he or she liked the same things 
as the older sibling. When Adam [age 12] said, “I love sushi and raclette,” Gabriel [age 9], his 
younger brother, immediately replied, “same for me.” 
Conclusion 
The informants in this study are learning the ways of Bobos. Though their tastes are not identical 
to those of their parents, this is likely to be true for the same age group from any social class. 
They are somewhere in the middle of the process of figuring out what constitutes good taste in 
their social milieu. It is normal that adult Bobos have acquired more knowledge about what 
constitutes cultural capital in their world, while the tastes of young children in Bobo families are 
less filtered by expectations than those of pre-adolescents in this study. These informants might 
best be described as “proto-Bobos.” 
Like the tastes of their Bobo parents, these children’s tastes reflect the strategies of both the 
traditional bourgeoisie and of the new cultural omnivores for achieving social distinction. These 
children’s strategies for social distinction resemble the strategies of previous bourgeois 
generations in several ways. First, children understand that there is value in learning and 
imitating the tastes of bourgeois parents. Second, these children recognize that cultural capital 
cannot be easy to acquire or it would lose its value (Samuel’s quest for rare manga is an 
example). Finally, these children understand the value of authenticity in their cultural choices 
(the appreciation of subtitles is an example). At the same time, these informants show that unlike 
earlier bourgeois generations, cultural omnivorousness has established itself as a new form of 
cultural capital. This has manifested itself both through a shift from a hierarchization of foreign 
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cultures to hierarchizations within the cultural offerings of each country and through a shift from 
imagining one genre as superior to another to creating hierarchies of offerings within each genre.  
These children’s parents already exhibited signs of valuing culturally omnivorous tastes and 
were the first generation to do so. They in a sense invented it. However, for the children in this 
study, valuing cultural omnivorousness was more an act of imitation than invention. The fact that 
an appreciation for cultural omnivorousness has been transmitted from Bobo parents to Bobo 
pre-adolescents through the traditional bourgeois mechanism of imitation contributes to the 
legitimacy of this form of cultural capital. It is no longer something new, no longer something 
that runs counter to the tastes of the previous generation. It is a sign that cultural omnivorousness 
as a means of social distinction has gone from a probationary, exploratory phase to a more stable 
and lasting one. 
One might wonder why the criteria for what constitutes cultural capital are changing. Increased 
cultural omnivorousness among young French Bobos is certainly connected to technological 
changes, increasing ethnic diversity in France, and the globalization of cultural industries. which 
have all made more cultural options available. This increase in options, however, has not led to a 
democratization of culture, where equal access to many cultural forms has made it difficult to 
maintain social distinctions. In fact, it has had the opposite effect. Ever greater resources, in the 
form of time and cultural knowledge, which are not equally distributed across social groups, are 
required to sort through the growing number of options and determine which are valuable. 
Cultural capital must remain rare to maintain its value and this means that knowledge of which 
cultural products can contribute to it needs to remain a moving target. The enormous amount of 
options now available to cultural omnivores has only increased the number of possible directions 





1	Readers should note that though this article uses the term “popular” to describe mass media 
forms in television, music, and cinema, the French word “populaire” is used differently, namely 
to describe something associated with the working-class, and the children in this study never 
used the term in their discussions with me. The use of the word “populaire” to describe 
phenomena related to the working class can be traced back at least to 1936, “when such access 
first became government policy under the Popular Front, it was described as popularisation and 
indicated by the attachment of the epithet populaire to activities as diverse as theatre, sport and 
aviation. From then on, for the artists, animateurs and politicians committed to it, la culture 
populaire tended to signify above all that the working class should have access to cultural, 
educational and leisure activities previously reserved for a bourgeois elite; it meant a culture 
brought to people rather than made by them.” (David Looseley, “Cultural Democratisation and 
Popular Music.” Modern and Contemporary France, February, 2003, 46-47)  In the United 
States and Britain, “‘popular’ usually includes mass forms like television and pop music, [while] 
‘populaire’ usually does not. This is conceivably why popular music in the form of rock and pop 
has always been designated not by the term musique populaire (an expression still not used all 
that widely, except sometimes in the plural) but by a succession of terms adapted from English: 
le yéyé, la pop-musique (or just la pop), le rock and more recently la world music, le rap, and la 
techno…” (Ibid).	
2	For more analysis of Bobos, see (Corbillé; Watrin and Legrand; Gunther).	
3	See for example: Avila-Saavedra, Guillermo, “Neither  here  nor  there:  Consumption  of  US 
media  among  pre-adolescent  girls  in  Ecuador,” Interactions:  Studies  in Communication & 
Culture, 4: 3 (2013); Huong, Nguyen. "Globalization, Consumerism, And The Emergence Of 
                                                             
 31 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
Teens In Contemporary Vietnam," Journal Of Social History 49.1 (2015); Omenugha, Kate 
Azuka, Chikezie Emmanuel Uzuegbunam, and Ike S. Ndolo, "Celebrity culture, media and the 
Nigerian youth: negotiating cultural identities in a globalised world." Critical Arts: A South-
North Journal of Cultural & Media Studies 30, no. 2 (2016).	
4	I received approval for this project from Wellesley College’s Institutional Review Board, which 
was required because I was conducting a study with minors. I prepared a consent form 
(Appendix B), which I had the parents of these children sign. I also asked for verbal assent from 
each child to make sure that they understood that their participation was completely voluntary, 
that they could withdraw at any time from the study, and that they could decline to answer any 
question in the study for any reason.	
5	They cite for example, an early work from Bourdieu (co-authored with Jean-Claude Passeron), 
Les Héritiers: Les étudiants et la culture, Paris Minuit, 1964.	
6	Peterson provides a summary of these works in (Peterson) He includes work from sociologists 
around the world: Australia Bennett et al. (1999), Emmison (2003). Austria Gebesmair (1998). 
Belgium Vander Stichele and Laermans (2003, 2004). Canada Erickson (1996), Fisher and 
Preece (2003), Friedman and Ollivier (2004). France Hennion et al. (2000), Coulangeon (2003, 
2005), Bellevance et al. (2004), Lahire (2004). Germany Kirchberg and Westphal (1997), 
Hartmann (1999), Gebesmair (2003, 2005). The Netherlands Van Rees et al. (1999), Van Eijck 
(1999, 2000, 2001), Van Eijck and Bargeman (2004), Van Eijck and Knulst (2005). Israel Katz- 
Gerro and Shavit (1998). Spain Lopez-Sintas and Garcıa-Alvarez (2002a, 2002b, 2004). Sweden 
Bihagen and Katz-Garro (2000). United Kingdom Longhurst and Mike (1996), Carrabine and 
Longhurst (1999), Warde et al. (1999), Olsen et al. (1998), Warde and Martens (2000), Tally 
Katz-Gerro and Sullivan (2004), Bennett et al. (2005), Savage et al. (2005), Chan and Goldthorp 
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(2005). United States Bryson (1996, 1997), DiMaggio (1996), Holt (1997), Kern (1997), Relish 
(1997), Roberts (1999), Barnett and Allen (2000), Weiss et al. (2001), Holbrook et al. (2002), 
Sonnett (2004), DiMaggio and Mukhtar (2004), Lopez-Sintas and Katz-Gerro (2005).	
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Appendix A 
List of informants 
Pseudonym Age Sex 
Manon 7 f 
Noah 7 m 
Sasha 7 m 
Adèle 8 f 
Louis 8 m 
Mathis 8 m 
Camille 9 f 
Clément 9 m 
Damien 9 m 
Gabriel 9 m 
Jennie 9 f 
Quentin 9 m 
Romane 9 f 
Théo 9 m 
Virgil 9 m 
Chloé 10 f 
Eugénie 10 f 
Jane 10 f 
Maxime 10 m 
Samuel 10 m 
Zoe 10 f 
Violette 11 f 
Yannis 11 m 
Adam 12 m 





Formulaire de Consentement :  La consommation médiatique des pré-adolescents en 
France 
Je sousigné(e), _________________________________________________, autorise  mon(mes) 
enfant(s), ____________________________________________________________________, à 
participer à l’enquête « la consommation médiatique des pré-adolescents en France » menée par 
Scott Gunther de Wellesley College. Je comprends qu’il s’agit d’étudier les attitudes des pré-
adolescents français vis-à-vis de diverses options médiatiques afin de comprendre à quel point 
leurs attitudes des médias populaires étrangers ressemblent ou diffèrent des opinions des pré-
adolescents déjà étudiés dans d’autres pays. 
Je comprends que mon(mes) enfant(s) se réunira/réuniront avec le chercheur et d’autres enfants 
(jusqu’à 5 enfants total) entre 7 et 12 ans pendant une heure maximum. Le chercheur posera aux 
participants des questions générales sur leurs préférences médiatiques et fera un enregistrement 
audio de la conversation.  
Je comprends que mon(mes) enfant(s) ne recevra/recevront pas de bénéfice direct pour sa/leur 
participation dans l’étude, mais contribuera/contribueront à l’érudition académique dans le 
domaine des études sociologiques des comportements médiatiques des enfants. 
Je comprends que la participation de mon(mes) enfant(s) est entièrement volontaire et 
qu’il(s)/elle(s) peut/peuvent se retirer à n’importe quel moment de cette étude, que ce soit avant 
les conversations en groupe ou pendant, et peut/peuvent refuser de répondre aux questions 
posées pour n’importe quelle raison. Avant de commencer la conversation, le chercheur vérifiera 
oralement avec les enfants qu’ils comprennent qu’ils peuvent se retirer de l’étude, qu’ils peuvent 
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refuser de répondre aux questions, et que tout ce qu’ils disent restera confidentiel (le cas échéant, 
il expliquera le sens du mot « confidentiel »). 
Je comprends que toute information qui pourrait servir à identifier mon(mes) enfant(s) restera 
confidentielle et ne figurera pas dans l’article final. Le chercheur gardera les enregistrements 
audio et ne les partagera avec personne. J’ai lu et compris ce formulaire de consentement et 
permets à mon(mes) enfant(s) de participer à cette enquête. Le chercheur me fournira une copie 
de ce formulaire que je pourrai garder.  
Signature du parent :          Date :   
Signature du chercheur :        Date :   
Nom(s) et date(s) de naissance de l’enfant/des enfants :        
              
Nom et l’adresse email du parent :           
Nom et l’adresse email du chercheur : [author’s name and email address] 
 
Pour les questions concernant l'expérience de votre enfant pendant l’enquête, veuillez contacter : 
le chef du comité de déontologie [contact information for IRB at author’s institution] 
Une copie de ce formulaire est aussi valable que l’original. 
